Vera Bradley Inc.

Vera Bradley lost $2.15 a share on $372 million in sales last year, and the whole company is worth about $97 million.

If you own VRA, you own a tiny bag brand trying to fix a business that just shrank 21%.

vra

consumer · retail & accessories micro cap updated jan 9, 2026
$2.16
market cap ~$97M · 52-week range $1–$4
xvary composite: 40 / 100 · below average
our overall rating — combines growth, value, risk, and momentum
Start here if you're new
what it is
Vera Bradley sells patterned bags, travel gear, accessories, and jewelry through its own stores, wholesale partners, and Pura Vida.
how it gets paid
Last year Vera Bradley made $372M in revenue. Vera Bradley Direct was the main engine at $223M, or 60% of sales.
why growth slowed
Revenue fell 21.0% last year. EDGAR shows quarterly revenue of $185 million and gross margin of 45.7%.
what just happened
The quarter was ugly: EPS came in at -$1.80 as the full-year collapse finally hit the income statement.
At a glance
C++ balance sheet — some cracks in the foundation
15/100 earnings predictability — expect surprises
3.0% return on capital — nothing to write home about
-$2.15 fy2024 eps est
$372M fy2024 rev est
xvary composite: 40/100 — below average
What they do
Vera Bradley sells patterned bags, travel gear, accessories, and jewelry through its own stores, wholesale partners, and Pura Vida.
This is not a scale story. It is a brand story. Vera Bradley still did $372 million in annual sales in fiscal 2025, which means plenty of people still know the name and buy the bags. If management fixes the product and inventory, your upside comes from a recognized brand selling into closets and gift lists, not from building demand from zero.
consumer discretionary micro-cap consumer-brand turnaround retail
How they make money
$372M annual revenue · their business grew -21.0% last year
Vera Bradley Direct
$223M
2.6%
Vera Bradley Indirect
$104M
flat
Pura Vida
$45M
flat
The products that matter
company-owned sales channel
Direct retail & e-commerce
$74.5M · 88% of Q4 revenue
It produced $74.5M in Q4 revenue, or 88% of the quarter, but still fell 2.6% from a year ago. That is the core problem and the core opportunity.
main channel
third-party partner sales
Wholesale & licensing
$10.4M · 12% of Q4 revenue
This brought in $10.4M in Q4. It matters less for scale than for reach, because a 12% slice is not large enough to carry the business if direct keeps slipping.
smaller channel
inventory and margin cleanup
Merchandise reset
$76M inventory · 47.8% Q4 gross margin
Inventory fell 17% to $76M while Q4 gross margin improved to 47.8%. That suggests the cleanup is real. The question is whether cleaner inventory can become cleaner demand.
turnaround lever
Key numbers
21.0%
annual sales drop
This is the whole story. When revenue falls 21%, you are not debating optimization. You are debating whether the brand can still pull people in.
-$2.15
FY diluted EPS
Full-year EPS → loss per share → so what: the income statement is underwater; do not read a positive “operating margin” here as healthy profit.
$67M
long-term debt
That is a big bill for a company with about a $97 million equity value, which means less room for mistakes.
3.0%
return on capital
Return on capital → profit generated from money invested → so what: the business is earning very little on the resources tied up inside it.
Financial health
C++
strength
  • balance sheet grade C++ — below average — limited financial resources
  • risk rank 3 — safer than 50% of stocks
  • price stability 15 / 100
  • long-term debt $67M (41% of capital)
C++ — balance sheet grade and long-term debt are flagged. this stock carries more risk than average.
Total return vs. market

Return history isn't available for VRA right now.

source: institutional data · return history unavailable
What just happened
missed estimates
The quarter was ugly: EPS came in at -$1.80 as the full-year collapse finally hit the income statement.
EDGAR shows quarterly revenue of $185 million and gross margin of 45.7%. But shows fiscal 2025 EPS of -$2.15, versus $0.25 the year before. Translation: the product still sold, but the business model broke.
$185M
quarter revenue
-$1.80
quarter EPS (loss)
45.7%
gross margin
the number that mattered
The key number is -$2.15 full-year EPS, down from $0.25 a year earlier— that tells you the turnaround went backward, not forward.
source: company earnings report, 2026

Get this snapshot in your inbox

This page, delivered free — plus weekly updates when the numbers change. plain english, no spam.

weekly updates earnings alerts plain english no spam
What could go wrong

the #1 risk is brand erosion in the core direct channel.

med
Direct channel weakness
Direct segment revenue was $74.5M in Q4, or 88% of the quarter, and still fell 2.6% from a year ago. When almost all the business runs through your own channel, small traffic misses matter.
If direct demand does not stabilize, the turnaround story breaks before it starts.
med
Revenue decline versus margin repair
Annual revenue is estimated at $372M after a 21% drop last year, even as Q4 gross margin improved to 47.8%. Better inventory economics help, but you cannot cost-cut your way into a growth story forever.
If sales keep shrinking, margin improvement becomes damage control rather than evidence of a real reset.
med
CEO transition risk
Ian Bickley took over on March 12, 2026, with the prior CEO leaving on June 27, 2026. New leadership can sharpen the assortment, or spend a few quarters learning the problem the hard way.
A delayed strategy reset would leave investors staring at more waiting while a 15/100 predictability score keeps doing what it does.
A $84.9M quarter and a 9.8% revenue beat are real positives, but the combined risk picture still comes back to this: 88% of Q4 revenue sits in the direct channel and annual sales are still down 21%.
source: institutional data · regulatory filings · risk analysis
Pay attention to
trend
Direct revenue needs to stop falling
The direct segment was $74.5M in Q4 and down 2.6% from a year ago. That line needs to flatten before you can tell a serious turnaround story.
metric
Gross margin after the 47.8% quarter
Margin improved by 100 basis points. If that slips back while revenue is still weak, the recent progress starts to look cosmetic.
calendar
Next earnings print
The next update is the next real scorecard. You need to see whether cleaner inventory and a new CEO translate into steadier demand, not just nicer commentary.
risk
Long-range targets that do not reconcile cleanly
The snapshot includes a fiscal 2027 sales plan of $255M–$270M while also showing $372M of annual revenue elsewhere. Until management or the data set bridges that gap, treat long-range target math carefully.
Analyst rankings
earnings predictability
15 / 100
Low predictability means the numbers can swing around more than you want. In human-speak, analysts do not see this business as stable yet.
risk rank
3
That puts the stock around the middle of the market on broad risk screens. In plain English: not a total disaster, not a safe harbor.
source: institutional data
Institutional activity

institutional ownership data for VRA is being compiled.

source: institutional data
Price targets
3-5 year target range
n/a n/a
$2 current price
n/a target midpoint · n/a from current
target data not available

Want the deeper analysis?

The full deep dive: dcf model, scenario analysis, competitive moat breakdown, and quarterly tracking — everything on this page, taken further.

see plans from $5/mo
The deep dive
VRA
xvary deep dive
vra
the full analysis is in the works.
what you'll get
dcf valuation model
bull / base / bear scenarios
competitive moat breakdown
quarterly earnings tracker
operating model projections
risk matrix with kill criteria
original price target + conviction
updated with every earnings
free · no spam · you'll be first to read it