uri

URI’s revenue base has continued to scale even as quarterly run-rates fluctuate with fleet utilization, pricing, and project timing. The audited full-year revenue figure of $16.10B for 2025 compares with $15.35B in the quarterly series shown in the chart, while the most recent quarter ended 2025-09-30 delivered $4.23B of revenue versus $3.94B in the prior sequential annualized reference used in the panel. That quarter also produced $1.67B of gross profit and $1.11B of operating income, translating to a 39.4% gross margin and 26.3% operating margin in the chart sequence before settling at 38.2% and 24.7% at the latest point...

Margin performance remains one of URI’s most important fundamental signals because the company’s profitability is highly sensitive to fleet utilization and pricing discipline. The source data shows gross margin of 38.2%, operating margin of 24.7%, and net margin of 15.5% in the latest deterministic outputs. The margin chart indicates a clear range: gross margin peaked at 41.3% in the FY2024 sequence before drifting to 36.5% in FY2025 and then recovering toward 39.4% before ending at 38.2%...

The balance sheet shows URI remains a leveraged industrial platform, but not one that appears distressed based on the available data. Total liabilities were $20.90B at 2025-12-31 against shareholders’ equity of $8.97B, producing a debt-to-equity ratio of 1.59 and total liabilities to equity of 2.33. Long-term debt increased from $13.47B in 2024 to $14.30B in 2025, while cash and equivalents were $459.0M at year-end...

URI should be treated as a semi-contestable market participant rather than a proven non-contestable monopolist. The company’s 2025 audited economics are excellent, $16.10B revenue, 24.7% operating margin, 31.0% FCF margin, but the available data doesn't provide the decisive Greenwald evidence that a new entrant couldn't match URI’s cost structure or capture equivalent demand at the same price. The key point is that the incumbent’s profitability is observable, while the protection mechanisms aren't...

URI appears to have meaningful scale economics, but the durability of those economics depends on whether scale is paired with customer captivity. The company’s 2025 revenue of $16.10B and operating income of $3.97B indicate a large fixed-cost base is being spread across substantial volume, and the audited gross margin of 38.2% suggests good operating scale effect. However, the available data doesn't quantify fleet density, branch coverage, procurement advantage, or maintenance-cost curves versus peers, so the precise fixed-cost intensity can't be proven from the available facts...

A bottom-up TAM for URI should be built from the revenue pool it can actually serve: branch network reach, fleet deployment intensity, customer mix, and rental utilization. Using the available filings, the only fully verifiable anchor is the company’s own run-rate scale, $16.10B of 2025 revenue, $3.97B of operating income, and $4.993B of free cash flow. That tells us URI already participates in a very large market, but it doesn't let us safely infer the full market pool without external market-revenue data...

URI’s current penetration can be discussed only relative to its own scale, because the available data doesn't provide external market share data. The best verifiable proxy is that the company produced $16.10B of 2025 revenue while maintaining a 19.0x P/E and 13.6x EV/EBITDA, which is consistent with a scaled incumbent rather than a niche player. The institutional survey’s industry rank of 26 of 94 further supports the idea that URI is already a top-tier participant in a broad industrial market...

URI doesn't disclose named supplier concentration in the available data, so the biggest concentration risk can't be measured directly; that's itself a reporting gap for a capital-intensive rental operator. What we can say is that the operating model is not showing stress consistent with a major single-source failure: 2025 revenue was $16.10B, gross margin was 38.2%, and operating margin was 24.7%, implying the fleet, parts, maintenance, and redeployment chain is still absorbing demand without obvious breakage...

The source data contains no disclosed sourcing-region or manufacturing-location split, so URI’s geographic dependency can't be measured precisely from audited facts. That said, a machinery-rental business with a $14.30B long-term debt load, $4.993B of free cash flow, and a fleet-dependent operating model is inherently exposed to regional disruptions affecting equipment availability, repair labor, and transport capacity. The absence of regional disclosure is important because it limits room to quantify whether the company is dependent on one country or one logistics corridor...

The most immediate catalyst for United Rentals is whether it can keep translating top-line growth into high-quality operating scale effect. The audited data show 2025 revenue of $16.10B, gross profit of $6.14B, operating income of $3.97B, and net income of $2.49B, with quarterly revenue of $4.23B and quarterly operating income of $1.11B at 2025-09-30. That implies a 24.7% operating margin and a 38.2% gross margin, which are strong for a capital-intensive equipment-rental business and create room for earnings to compound even if revenue growth remains modest...

Free cash flow is one of the clearest potential catalysts in URI because the deterministic model already shows $4.993B of free cash flow, a 31.0% FCF margin, and a 10.8% FCF yield. Those figures are important because they imply the company is generating meaningful cash relative to a $46.12B equity market value, even with a capital-intensive fleet and a balance sheet that carries $14.30B of long-term debt at 2025-12-31. The company’s cash and equivalents were only $459.0M at year-end 2025, so the market is likely to focus on ongoing cash conversion rather than absolute cash balances...

URI’s balance sheet is likely to remain a source of both support and scrutiny. The deterministic ratios show debt to equity of 1.59 and total liabilities to equity of 2.33, while current ratio is 0.94. At 2025-12-31, total liabilities were $20.90B against shareholders’ equity of $8.97B, and long-term debt stood at $14.30B...

STREET SAYS URI should be valued as a durable industrial compounder with modest top-line growth, high returns on capital, and continued support from buybacks. The factual backdrop is strong but mature: 2025 audited revenue was $16.10B, operating income was $3.97B, and diluted EPS was $38.61, while revenue growth was only +3.0% YoY. WE SAY the business quality is better than the market’s implied caution suggests...

We don't have a verified revision history in the supporting evidence, so the actual Street direction can't be quantified from this pane. That said, the latest audited results and institutional survey imply a likely debate around whether the company can sustain 24.7% operating margins and 27.8% ROE while revenue growth remains only +3.0%. The most plausible revision pressure points are EPS durability, buyback support, and debt load...

URI’s earnings quality profile looks solid because cash generation comfortably exceeds reported profit. For 2025, the company produced $2.49B of net income, $5.19B of operating cash flow, and $4.993B of free cash flow, while the deterministic FCF margin was 31.0%. That spread is the hallmark of a business where earnings are being converted into cash at a healthy rate rather than being inflated by working-capital or non-cash accounting noise...

The Source data doesn't include a 90-day analyst revision series, so the revision trend can't be measured directly and should be treated as unavailable here. What we can say is that the company’s latest audited results show an earnings base that remains very strong: $16.10B of revenue, $3.97B of operating income, and $38.61 of diluted EPS in 2025. That backdrop usually reduces the need for large downward estimate resets unless utilization or pricing deteriorates...

There's no direct alternative-data feed in the available data for job postings, web traffic, app downloads, or patent filings, so the pane shouldn't pretend to see a signal where none is observable. That said, the financial read-through is still informative: URI’s +3.0% revenue growth, paired with 38.2% gross margin and 31.0% free cash flow margin, implies the operating engine is producing cash without needing visible acceleration in external demand proxies...

Institutional sentiment is constructive but not extreme. The independent survey assigns URI a Technical Rank of 2, Safety Rank of 3, Timeliness Rank of 3, and Financial Strength B+, which is consistent with a stock that can be owned by quality-oriented investors without being classified as a top-tier defensive compounder. The Earnings Predictability score of 85 also suggests the name is viewed as relatively forecastable for a cyclical industrial...

From the audited 2025 results, management appears to be building rather than eroding competitive advantage. Revenue reached $16.10B in 2025, operating income was $3.97B, and net income was $2.49B, while gross margin held at 38.2% and operating margin at 24.7%. That's the profile of a team that's defending spread economics while running a large, scaled fleet business, not chasing volume at the expense of returns...

The supplied data doesn't include board composition, committee membership, staggered-board status, poison pill terms, or shareholder-rights provisions, so independence and governance quality can't be verified directly. On the operational side, however, the 2025 record implies a management team under real discipline: debt load was meaningful, with debt-to-equity of 1.59 and total liabilities-to-equity of 2.33, yet returns stayed strong at ROE 27.8% and ROIC 13.7%. For investors, the key governance question is whether the board is effectively supervising balance-sheet expansion and acquisition/goodwill accumulation...

URI’s commodity sensitivity can't be quantified from the available data because there's no audited breakdown of COGS by input category, no hedging disclosure, and no operating KPI set for fleet depreciation, parts, tires, fuel, steel, or other consumables. The only hard cost data available are cost of revenue of $9.96B in 2025 and gross margin of 38.2%, which tells us the company preserved attractive spread economics but not which input lines drove that outcome. Because this is a rental-heavy industrial platform, the practical macro question is whether cost inflation can be passed through to customers via higher rental rates...

There's no audited tariff schedule, product-by-region exposure map, or China supply-chain dependency disclosure in the available data, so trade policy risk can't be quantified from primary data. For URI, the most relevant question would be whether imported fleet components, parts, or replacement equipment face tariff pressure that could raise capex or maintenance costs, but that linkage is here...

URI is economically tied to construction and industrial activity, but the available data doesn't provide a formal correlation to consumer confidence, GDP, housing starts, or ISM. The strongest supported proxy is the company’s own operating performance: 2025 revenue of $16.10B, operating income of $3.97B, and revenue growth of +3.0%. That profile suggests demand is cyclical but not volatile enough to require a collapse in macro indicators before the business feels pressure...

URI’s liquidity profile is partially observable from the available data, but not fully quantifiable. The company ended 2025 with $459.0M in cash and equivalents, $3.61B in current assets, and $3.82B in current liabilities, so the business is not holding an oversized cash cushion relative to near-term obligations. What is most important for position sizing is that the provided data do not include average daily volume, bid-ask spread, institutional turnover, or a block-trade impact model...

The available data doesn't include price-history indicators needed to calculate or verify the 50 DMA/200 DMA position, RSI, MACD, or support/resistance levels. Those values are therefore and shouldn't be inferred from the current market price alone. What can be stated factually is that URI’s current market price is $1141.59 as of Mar 24, 2026, and the stock carries an institutional Technical Rank of 2 on a 1-to-5 scale where 1 is best...

We don't have a live option-chain feed in the Source data, so the exact 30-day IV, IV rank, and realized-volatility spread can't be measured directly here. What we can say with confidence is that URI’s equity is already a high-delta, high-dollar-premium name: the stock trades at $1141.59, with a beta of 1.60 in the institutional survey, and the market-cap-based debt ratio used in WACC is only 0.31 even though book debt load is materially higher. That mix usually supports a richer volatility surface than the index, particularly around earnings or macro-sensitive industrial prints...

No live options flow, strike-by-strike open interest, or trade tape was included in the Source data, so there's no verified unusual activity to report for URI. That said, the stock’s fundamentals imply the types of structures institutional investors would typically prefer: long-dated calls or call spreads if they want to express upside in a cash-generative industrial, and protective puts or put spreads if they want to hedge the levered balance-sheet profile...

Short interest, days to cover, and cost-to-borrow data aren't present in the Source data, so squeeze risk can't be quantified directly. Based on the available fundamentals, URI doesn't look like a classic squeeze candidate: the company produced $4.993B of free cash flow in 2025, maintained a 31.0% FCF margin, and reported $459.0M of cash against $14.30B of long-term debt. That profile is usually more consistent with a premium-quality cyclical than with a balance-sheet stress story that attracts persistent short sellers...

URI’s shareholder-rights profile can't be fully validated from the available data because the necessary DEF 14A and charter/bylaw details are absent. Based on the data available here, poison pill status, classified-board status, dual-class structure, voting standard, proxy access, and proposal history are all n/a. From an investor-protection perspective, that creates a practical problem: the market is being asked to underwrite a large, levered industrial franchise without the basic governance architecture that would tell us whether minority holders have strong protections...

On the evidence provided, URI’s accounting quality looks solid but not pristine. The strongest support is cash conversion: deterministic outputs show $5.19B of operating cash flow and $4.993B of free cash flow, alongside a 31.0% FCF margin and 10.8% FCF yield. That's a good sign that reported earnings are backed by cash rather than unusually aggressive accruals...

URI is a business that's understandable at a high level because it rents equipment, monetizes utilization, and earns through pricing discipline and fleet productivity; I would score that 4/5. The long-term outlook is also attractive because the company generated $4.993B of free cash flow in 2025 and sustained a 31.0% FCF margin, which suggests durable economics even in an asset-heavy model. Management quality looks reasonably strong, but not pristine, so I would score it 4/5...

URI appears to be in the Maturity phase of its industry cycle: growth is positive but not explosive, with revenue growth of +3.0% YoY, while profitability remains strong at 24.7% operating margin and 15.5% net margin. That combination is classic for a large industrial platform that has moved beyond early adoption and now depends on execution, pricing discipline, and capital allocation to keep compounding. The balance sheet and market response reinforce that view...

URI’s recurring historical pattern is a disciplined response to cycle noise: preserve margins, convert earnings into cash, and use excess cash to support per-share compounding. The 2025 audited results show this clearly, with $5.19B in operating cash flow, $4.993B in free cash flow, and share count declining to 63.1M by year-end from 64.5M at 2025-06-30. That's exactly the pattern investors look for in mature industrial compounders that want to maintain premium valuation through volatility...