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what it is
It runs outpatient surgery centers and surgical hospitals where doctors send patients for non-emergency procedures.
how it gets paid
Last year Surgery Partners made $3.3B in revenue. Ambulatory surgery centers was the main engine at $1.85B, or 56% of sales.
why it's growing
Revenue grew 6.2% last year. EPS is still underwater: the score strip carries about -$1.33 FY2024 EPS (est.), while the recent quarter we highlight is nearer -$0.50—same story, different periods. Growth only counts if it survives interest costs.
what just happened
A recent quarter was on the order of ~$800M in revenue (roughly one-fourth of the ~$3.3B annual base), but EPS still landed around -$0.50.
At a glance
C++ balance sheet — some cracks in the foundation
30/100 earnings predictability — expect surprises
1.8% return on capital — nothing to write home about
-$1.33 fy2024 eps est
forward revenue est. noisy vs ~$3.3B trailing
xvary composite: 34/100 — weak
What they do
It runs outpatient surgery centers and surgical hospitals where doctors send patients for non-emergency procedures.
This business wins by being where your surgeon already works. It had 161 surgical facilities open at December 31, 2024, and partnerships with physicians mean referral flow is sticky. Partnerships → doctors own part of the site → they are paid to keep cases there, so your local scale matters more than a glossy brand.
How they make money
$3.3B
annual revenue · their business grew +6.2% last year
Ambulatory surgery centers
$1.85B
Surgical hospitals
$0.82B
Ancillary services
$0.33B
Physician practices
$0.20B
Urgent care facilities
$0.10B
The products that matter
outpatient surgical procedures
Ambulatory surgery centers
$1.85B · ~56% of revenue
matches the segment table above. revenue per case reached $4,917 in Q3 2025, up 2.8% from a year ago, so pricing is moving—just not enough to solve the whole capital structure.
core engine
inpatient surgical hospitals
Surgical hospitals
$0.82B · ~25% of revenue
second-largest line on the same table. together with ASCs, facilities are almost the entire ~$3.3B story.
facility mix
new facility development
De Novo Facilities
growth investment · data thin
management calls de novo development one of its highest-return opportunities, but this snapshot does not give unit economics. with $3.7B in debt, that missing detail matters.
needs proof
Key numbers
$3.7B
long-term debt
That debt stack is larger than the company's roughly $2 billion market cap, so creditors matter as much as shareholders here.
16.3%
operating margin
Operating margin → profit after running the business, before interest and taxes → so what: the facilities themselves are not the main problem.
1.8%
return on capital
Return on capital → earnings generated on invested money → so what: this company is not turning a large asset base into much profit.
$3.3B
annual revenue
The business is real and scaled, with $3.3 billion in annual sales, but scale without earnings is just expensive plumbing.
Financial health
C++
strength
- balance sheet grade C++ — below average — limited financial resources
- risk rank 4 — safer than 20% of stocks
- price stability 15 / 100
- long-term debt $3.7B (70% of capital)
C++ — balance sheet grade and long-term debt are flagged. this stock carries more risk than average.
Total return vs. market
Return history isn't available for SGRY right now.
source: institutional data · return history unavailable
What just happened
missed estimates
Latest quarter revenue was on the order of ~$800M (consolidated, not a misread multi-billion print), but EPS still landed around -$0.50.
That is the whole SGRY argument in one line: revenue can look “up huge” on a single quarter versus an easy year-ago compare even when the full-year line only grew ~6%. Profitability stayed underwater, and EPS in the data set is still negative.
~$800M
quarterly revenue
-$0.50
eps (q)
-$1.33
fy2024 eps (est.)
the number that mattered
The number that mattered was -$0.50 in EPS because revenue growth only counts if it survives interest costs, and this company has $3.7 billion of debt.
source: company earnings report, 2026
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What could go wrong
the #1 risk here is a debt-heavy balance sheet meeting a soft 2026 profitability outlook. Surgery Partners can post decent operating numbers and still disappoint you if the leverage does the talking.
med
soft 2026 EBITDA execution
Management guided to at least $530M in 2026 adjusted EBITDA, but the market did not trust the setup after earnings. That skepticism took 14.1% off the stock in one move.
If EBITDA slips, leverage looks worse immediately because the company already lost $77.9M on $3.3B of revenue last year.
med
$3.7B in long-term debt
Debt equals 70% of capital while the equity value is only about $2B. That is a lot of financial weight for a company with a -2.35% profit margin.
Even if operating margin stays at 15.1%, the balance sheet can keep common shareholders from seeing much of the benefit.
med
activist pressure and governance friction
Ortelius Advisors publicly pressed the company on March 10, 2026. Two days later, the board added a new independent director. That sequence suggests the governance debate is active, not theoretical.
Strategic reviews can help, but they also consume management attention in a year when execution already has no room for drift.
$3.7B of debt against a ~$2B market cap is the number that ties these risks together. If profit does not show up soon, the stock stays fragile.
source: institutional data · regulatory filings · risk analysis
Pay attention to
the number that mattered
at least $530M in 2026 adjusted EBITDA
That is management's public target. If quarterly results stop pointing there, the leverage thesis gets harder to defend.
pricing
revenue per case
Q3 2025 revenue per case was $4,917, up 2.8% from a year ago. You want to see that number keep moving, because margin alone has not been enough.
capital allocation
$200M buyback versus debt paydown
A repurchase equal to roughly 10% of market cap sounds shareholder-friendly. The quiet part: every dollar spent here is a dollar not spent reducing leverage.
governance
post-activist board response
Ortelius went public on March 10. Lloyd Dean joined the board on March 12. Watch what changes next, not just who wrote the letters.
Analyst rankings
earnings predictability
30 / 100
Low predictability means the numbers have a habit of moving around. In human-speak, analysts do not view this as a clean, steady quarterly story.
risk rank
4
This score says the stock is safer than only 20% of names in the database. Translation: there are many calmer places to hide.
price stability
15 / 100
The stock does not trade like a defensive healthcare name. It trades like a leveraged small cap with something to prove.
source: institutional data
Institutional activity
institutional ownership data for SGRY is being compiled.
source: institutional data
Price targets
3-5 year target range
n/a
n/a
$15
current price
n/a
target midpoint · n/a from current
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