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what it is
Newell sells household, school, and outdoor brands like Rubbermaid, Sharpie, and Coleman.
how it gets paid
Last year Newell Brands made $7.2B in revenue. Home and Commercial Solutions was the main engine at $3.1B, or 43% of sales.
why growth slowed
Revenue fell 5.0% last year. In all, the bottom line came in at a share loss of $0.68 for the full year.
what just happened
Newell beat by $0.10 per share, but sales still shrank 5.0% vs. prior year.
At a glance
C+ balance sheet — struggling to keep the lights on
10/100 earnings predictability — expect surprises
14.8x trailing p/e — the market's not buying it — or you found a deal
6.3% dividend yield — cash in your pocket every quarter
3.5% return on capital — nothing to write home about
xvary composite: 15/100 — weak
What they do
Newell sells household, school, and outdoor brands like Rubbermaid, Sharpie, and Coleman.
Four brands — Rubbermaid, Sharpie, Coleman, and Graco — are already on your shelf. Newell had $7.2B in annual sales and 21,900 employees. Walmart still accounted for 17% of sales in 2025, so one retailer can move the whole story.
How they make money
$7.2B
annual revenue · their business grew -5.0% last year
Home and Commercial Solutions
$3.1B
Learning and Development
$1.8B
Outdoor and Recreation
$1.5B
Other brands
$0.8B
The products that matter
branded consumer and commercial products
core operating business
$7.2B revenue · -5.0% from last year
this snapshot only gives you the whole-company view: $7.2B of revenue, a 12.0% operating margin, and a 4.8% net margin. That tells you the key issue is not product mix. It is whether the portfolio can produce stable cash flow again.
turnaround depends on execution
divesting non-core assets
Winter Sports businesses
sale announced for $240
the Kohlberg & Company sale is small next to $7.2B of revenue, but it signals what management is trying to do: simplify the portfolio and free up capital. You are not buying growth here. You are buying cleanup.
portfolio reset
Key numbers
$7.2B
annual sales
This is the whole pie. Every segment fight is over slices of this number.
$4.5B
long-term debt
Debt is 71% of capital, so the balance sheet still has a foot on the brake.
6.3%
dividend yield
You get paid to wait, but the payout has to survive a 0.5% operating margin.
0.5%
operating margin
This is the sliver left after costs. A 1-point move on $7.2B is about $72M.
Financial health
C+
strength
- balance sheet grade C+ — weak — may struggle to fund operations
- risk rank 5 — safer than 5% of stocks
- price stability 15 / 100
- long-term debt $4.5B (71% of capital)
- net profit margin 4.8% — keeps 5 cents of every dollar in revenue
- return on equity 6% — $0.06 profit for every $1 investors have put in
C+ — balance sheet grade and long-term debt are flagged. this stock carries more risk than average.
Total return vs. market
You invested $10,000 in NWL 3 years ago → it's now worth $3,510.
The index would have given you $14,540.
source: institutional data · total return
What just happened
beat estimates
Newell beat by $0.10 per share, but sales still shrank 5.0% vs. prior year.
Yahoo Finance showed $0.18 actual EPS versus $0.08 expected. EDGAR’s latest quarter showed $5.3B of revenue, $0.07 EPS, and 34.0% gross margin, so the beat and the latest filing are not the same quarter.
$5.3B
revenue
$0.07
eps
34.0%
gross margin
the number that mattered
The $0.18 result mattered because it beat the $0.08 estimate by 125.0%, but the business still runs on a 0.5% operating margin.
-
newell brands registered a steep loss in 2025.
-
the company’s deficit ballooned to $0.75 per share during the fourth quarter, erasing the profits recorded in the prior two quarters.
-
in all, the bottom line came in at a share loss of $0.68 for the full year.
-
sales slipped roughly 3% for the december stanza, and were down 5% for 2025.newell’s widescale restructuring efforts only partially countered the negative impact of inflation and tariff costs.
-
the consumer goods maker should begin to recover this year.market headwinds will probably persist in the near term, however newell’s aggressive turnaround efforts ought to continue to take hold, tempering margin pressures.
source: company earnings report, 2026
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What could go wrong
the #1 risk here is not generic consumer weakness. it is leverage on a shrinking revenue base.
high
$4.5B of long-term debt limits your margin for error
Long-term debt equals 71% of capital. That is a lot of leverage for a business with 4.8% net margins and weak price stability.
If sales stay under pressure, debt stops being background noise and becomes the main reason the stock stays cheap.
high
one customer at 17% of revenue is concentration risk wearing a retail badge
Top-customer concentration at 17% means Newell does not have total control over its own demand picture.
If that customer cuts shelf space, changes terms, or pushes price, the effect shows up fast in a $7.2B business that already declined 5.0%.
med
the 6.3% dividend yield attracts buyers, but it also raises the question
High yields can be a gift. They can also be the market pricing in stress. With 3.5% return on capital, Newell does not have much excess earning power.
If the dividend ever needs to be reset, the stock loses one of the few things still pulling income investors in.
med
portfolio cleanup only matters if the core business stabilizes
Selling the Winter Sports businesses for $240 may simplify the portfolio, but it does not solve a companywide revenue decline by itself.
You need the sale to be the start of repair, not a one-off transaction that makes the numbers look cleaner for a quarter.
$4.5B of long-term debt, 17% customer concentration, and a 5.0% sales decline are enough to explain why this stock screens weak even with a 6.3% yield.
source: institutional data · regulatory filings · risk analysis
Pay attention to
balance sheet
$4.5B of long-term debt is still 71% of capital
if that number is not moving down, the turnaround case is not doing enough work.
trend
sales were down 5.0% from last year
the stock does not need hyper-growth. it does need the decline to stop.
customer risk
17% of revenue sits with one customer
that is concentration risk hiding inside a consumer-brands story.
next report
10 / 100 predictability means the next print matters more than usual
when earnings are this hard to model, one quarter can move the stock faster than a full year of narratives.
Analyst rankings
earnings predictability
10 / 100
in human-speak, analysts do not trust the next few quarters to come in clean.
risk rank
5
safer than only 5% of stocks. this sits near the risky end of the market.
price stability
15 / 100
the stock does not trade like a safe consumer staple. it trades like a company still arguing with its own balance sheet.
source: institutional data
Institutional activity
institutions have been net buying for 3 consecutive quarters — 165 buyers vs. 137 sellers in 4q2025. total institutional holdings: 0.4B shares. net buying for 3 quarters.
source: institutional data
Price targets
3-5 year target range
$3
$14
$4
current price
$9
target midpoint · +103% from current · 3-5yr high: $14 (+215% · 36% ann'l return)
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