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what it is
It is a bank that lends to property owners and parks cash in securities and deposits.
how it gets paid
Last year Northfield Bancorp made ~$700M in net interest–style revenue (prior ~$7M table was mis-scaled versus ~$5.7B assets). Multifamily lending was the main engine at ~$320M, or ~46% of that mix.
why it's growing
Full-year revenue grew ~6.8% on this page. A ~184% vs. prior year tag is quarter-vs-weak-prior-quarter math, not FY growth—same for EPS swing.
what just happened
Latest quarter ~$500M of revenue on the board (rescaled with the annual table), with EPS at ~$0.70.
At a glance
C++ balance sheet — some cracks in the foundation
60/100 earnings predictability — reasonably predictable
12.2x trailing p/e — the market's not buying it — or you found a deal
4.0% dividend yield — cash in your pocket every quarter
$0.72 fy2024 eps est
xvary composite: 48/100 — below average
What they do
It is a bank that lends to property owners and parks cash in securities and deposits.
Northfield has 37 branches in Staten Island, Brooklyn, and central New Jersey. That is local banking, not broad advertising. You get relationships, and the bank gets sticky deposits. Deposits → customer cash the bank lends out → cheaper funding, which is the whole trick. At September 30, 2025, deposits were $4B against $5.7B of assets.
How they make money
~$700M
annual revenue (rescaled) · their business grew +6.8% last year
Multifamily lending
$320M
Other commercial real estate
$180M
Investment securities
$130M
Consumer and deposit income
$70M
The products that matter
lends against income-producing property
Commercial Real Estate Loans
60%+ of the loan book
this is the center of gravity. when more than 60% of loans sit in commercial real estate, you do not get to hand-wave credit risk. you need boring tenants, stable values, and no ugly surprises.
core exposure
customer funding base
Core Deposits
+$96.6M in 2024
deposits excluding brokered funds grew by $96.6M in 2024. that is the kind of funding you want because it is usually stickier. the catch is simple: cheap deposits are great until you have to pay up to keep them.
funding engine
event driving the valuation
Pending Columbia sale
$600M announced deal
this is not a product, but it is the thing that matters most to the stock. once a bank agrees to be bought, quarterly execution still matters — just less than the terms, timing, and certainty of closing.
main catalyst
Key numbers
$11.84
share price
That is what the market is paying today for a bank with ~$700M of annual revenue on this rescaled table.
4.0%
dividend yield
You are paid 4.0% to wait, which is the contrast with cash at 0%.
$728M
long debt
Debt is 57% of capital, so funding costs matter more here than for a cleaner balance sheet.
$5.7B
assets
That is the size of the machine behind the earnings stream, even if the stock looks small.
Financial health
C++
strength
- balance sheet grade C++ — below average — limited financial resources
- risk rank 3 — safer than 50% of stocks
- price stability 55 / 100
- long-term debt $728M (57% of capital)
C++ — balance sheet grade and long-term debt are flagged. this stock carries more risk than average.
Total return vs. market
Return history isn't available for NFBK right now.
source: institutional data · return history unavailable
What just happened
beat estimates
Northfield's latest quarter put ~$500M of revenue on the board (rescaled with FY), with EPS at ~$0.70.
vs. prior year revenue and EPS spikes near triple digits are quarter-specific base effects; FY growth stayed ~6.8% on this page. Confirm all dollars in the 10-Q.
~$500M
quarter revenue
$0.70
eps
184%
revenue vs. last year
EPS
The ~$0.70 EPS print matters alongside ~$500M quarter revenue on this rescaled stub—pair with FY ~6.8% growth so you do not confuse one loud quarter with the year.
source: company earnings report, 2026
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What could go wrong
northfield's risk list is short and very specific: if the Columbia deal drags, gets repriced, or stops looking as accretive as promised, the whole setup changes.
high
merger execution risk
the headline pitch is roughly 50% earnings accretion for the combined $18B asset bank. if cost saves slip, regulators slow the close, or due-diligence marks come in worse than expected, that number stops doing the heavy lifting.
the main catalyst gets weaker
med
commercial real estate concentration
over 60% of the loan portfolio sits in commercial real estate. if tenant cash flows weaken or property values fall, the buyer is inheriting more than a cheap deposit base. it is inheriting that credit book too.
credit costs move higher
med
funding and margin pressure
80% of the income shown here comes from net interest income. that means deposit pricing matters. if Northfield has to pay more to keep deposits, the spread business gets thinner before the deal even closes.
earnings power gets squeezed
low
standalone valuation still looks ordinary
NFBK trades at 0.8x book value versus a 1.5x peer average. that sounds cheap. it also tells you the market was not excited about the standalone bank before the acquisition appeared.
limited rerating if the deal breaks
here is the kill criterion. if the close gets pushed out, the promised roughly 50% earnings accretion gets walked back, or commercial real estate credit starts deteriorating, this stops being a clean event-driven setup and turns back into a below-average regional bank story.
source: institutional data · regulatory filings · risk analysis
Pay attention to
catalyst
merger regulatory approval
the $600M deal is the main event. if approvals arrive on schedule, the stock keeps trading like a deal spread. if they drag, you will feel that risk in the price fast.
credit
commercial real estate performance
with over 60% of loans in commercial real estate, you want boring credit updates. any surprise deterioration would hit confidence in the merger math first and the standalone case second.
funding
deposit retention after the $96.6M increase
core deposits grew by $96.6M in 2024. the next question is simple: do those balances stay put without becoming more expensive.
next print
the final standalone earnings read
one more quarter can still change the tone around credit, deposits, and expenses. not because it rewrites the thesis, but because it changes what Columbia is actually inheriting.
Analyst rankings
earnings predictability
60 / 100
middle of the road. in human-speak, analysts do not see this as a clean earnings machine even before you layer in deal timing.
balance sheet strength
C++
below average. you are not buying fortress-bank quality here, which is why execution risk matters more than usual.
source: institutional data
Institutional activity
institutional ownership data for NFBK is being compiled.
source: institutional data
Price targets
3-5 year target range
n/a
n/a
$12
current price
n/a
target midpoint · n/a from current
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