Duluth Holdings

Duluth did $627 million in sales and still lost $1.31 a share. That is a lot of flannel for very little profit.

If you own Duluth, you own a brand people know and a business barely making money.

dlth

consumer small cap updated jan 9, 2026
$2.07
market cap ~$79M · 52-week range $2–$5
xvary composite: 26 / 100 · weak
our overall rating — combines growth, value, risk, and momentum
Start here if you're new
what it is
Duluth sells workwear, casual clothes, and gear through its website, catalogs, and 63 U.S. stores.
how it gets paid
Last year Duluth made $627M in revenue. men's workwear and clothing was the main engine at $251M, or 40% of sales.
why growth slowed
Revenue fell 3.1% last year. Gross margin was 53.6%, which means the product still sells at decent markups.
what just happened
The latest quarter showed $349M in revenue, but EPS stayed negative at -$0.71, which is the part you cannot ignore.
At a glance
C balance sheet — red flag territory — real financial stress
35/100 earnings predictability — expect surprises
1.0% return on capital — nothing to write home about
-$1.31 fy2024 eps est
$627M fy2024 rev est
xvary composite: 26/100 — weak
What they do
Duluth sells workwear, casual clothes, and gear through its website, catalogs, and 63 U.S. stores.
You do not buy Duluth because it is cheap. You buy it because the brand has built a very specific workwear voice, sold through its own website, catalogs, and 63 stores, which keeps the customer relationship in-house. Direct-to-consumer → selling without a middleman → so what: you keep more control over pricing and the customer, but only if that brand pull is strong enough to cover the rent.
consumer micro-cap direct-to-consumer apparel turnaround
How they make money
$627M annual revenue · their business grew -3.1% last year
men's workwear and clothing
$251M
women's workwear and clothing
$157M
underwear and basics
$94M
outerwear and footwear
$75M
accessories and hard goods
$50M
The products that matter
primary sales channel
Direct-to-consumer
$590M · 94% of revenue
This is the core business. Website, digital demand, and catalog response carry almost all of the revenue load. When sales slipped 3.1%, this channel felt it.
94% of revenue
physical brand presence
Retail stores
$37M · 6% of revenue
Stores are small in the mix and flat on sales. That makes them more brand theater than profit engine until the company proves otherwise.
flat sales
customer acquisition engine
Catalogs and marketing
863377 text list mention
The company still leans on direct-response habits. That can work for niche retail. The catch is simple: marketing only matters if it produces profitable repeat demand, and the -5% net margin says that loop is not clean yet.
brand demand test
Key numbers
-$1.31
fy2024 eps est
$627M
fy2024 rev est
53.6%
gross margin
Gross profit kept about 53.6% of each revenue dollar.
n/a
dividend yield
Financial health
C
strength
  • balance sheet grade C — very weak — significant financial distress
  • risk rank 5 — safer than 5% of stocks
  • price stability 15 / 100
  • long-term debt $132M (62% of capital)
C — balance sheet grade and long-term debt are flagged. this stock carries more risk than average.
Total return vs. market

Return history isn't available for DLTH right now.

source: institutional data · return history unavailable
What just happened
missed estimates
The latest quarter showed $349M in revenue, but EPS stayed negative at -$0.71, which is the part you cannot ignore.
Revenue snapped higher vs. prior year, up 204%, and gross margin was 53.6%. The quiet part out loud: strong merchandise margin means less if the business still cannot turn that into profit per share.
$349M
revenue
$0.71
eps
53.6%
gross margin
the number that mattered
Gross margin was 53.6%, which means the product still sells at decent markups. The problem is everything after that line.
source: company earnings report, 2026

Get this snapshot in your inbox

This page, delivered free — plus weekly updates when the numbers change. plain english, no spam.

weekly updates earnings alerts plain english no spam
What could go wrong

Duluth does not need a theoretical risk list. The actual one is already crowded: a fraud probe, negative profitability, and $132M of long-term debt sitting on a $79M market cap.

med
Legal overhang gets more expensive
The Schall Law Firm announced an investigation into possible securities law violations. Even before any outcome, the existence of the probe adds friction to a company that already looks operationally strained.
If the matter expands into litigation, you are looking at added cash cost, management distraction, and another reason the market keeps the valuation compressed.
med
Sales drift turns into balance-sheet pressure
Revenue fell 3.1% vs. prior year to $627M while long-term debt sits at $132M, or 62% of capital. That is the contrast that matters.
If top-line pressure continues, the company loses time. A small-cap retailer with losses does not get unlimited tries to fix the model.
med
Governance optics stay awkward
The CEO employment agreement amendment and new equity grant landed during a period of losses and weak share performance. That does not prove anything improper. It does affect how investors read incentives.
If operating results do not improve, compensation decisions become a bigger part of the story than management wants.
The key risk is simple: the turnaround thesis runs on time, and debt plus legal noise reduce how much time you have.
source: institutional data · regulatory filings · risk analysis
Pay attention to
calendar
Q4 2025 earnings release on march 19, 2026
This is the next clean checkpoint. You want to hear whether revenue stabilizes, whether losses narrow, and whether management addresses the investigation with specifics instead of soft language.
legal
Fraud investigation updates
Right now the probe is an overhang. If it escalates, the story shifts from retail turnaround to capital preservation very quickly.
metric
Profit margin versus gross margin
53.6% gross margin and -5% net margin should not coexist forever. Either operating discipline improves or the gross margin story stops mattering.
trend
Direct-to-consumer demand
Direct-to-consumer is $590M, or 94% of revenue. If that channel does not turn, there is no second engine on this page ready to bail the company out.
Analyst rankings
earnings predictability
35 / 100
in human-speak, analysts do not see a steady enough business here to model with much confidence.
risk rank
5 / 100
Safer than only 5% of stocks means you are buying a fragile setup, not a bargain-bin defensive name.
source: institutional data
Institutional activity

institutional ownership data for DLTH is being compiled.

source: institutional data
Price targets
3-5 year target range
n/a n/a
$2 current price
n/a target midpoint · n/a from current
target data not available

Want the deeper analysis?

The full deep dive: dcf model, scenario analysis, competitive moat breakdown, and quarterly tracking — everything on this page, taken further.

see plans from $5/mo
The deep dive
DLTH
xvary deep dive
dlth
the full analysis is in the works.
what you'll get
dcf valuation model
bull / base / bear scenarios
competitive moat breakdown
quarterly earnings tracker
operating model projections
risk matrix with kill criteria
original price target + conviction
updated with every earnings
free · no spam · you'll be first to read it