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what it is
Clearwater sells software that helps big investors track portfolios, book the numbers, and get reports every day instead of waiting weeks.
how it gets paid
Last year Clearwater Analytics made $731M in revenue. investment accounting was the main engine at $292M, or 40% of sales.
why it's growing
Revenue grew 61.9% last year. The key number was 67.3% gross margin, because it shows the software model is healthy even while EPS stays negative.
what just happened
With ~$731M annual revenue, a typical quarter is closer to ~$180M than half a billion—if you see a $500M+ quarterly figure, re-check whether it is TTM, pro forma, or a different revenue line in the 10-Q. EPS stayed negative (~-$0.10) in the cited window.
At a glance
B++ balance sheet — above average — nothing keeping you up at night
trailing p/e — distorted while GAAP EPS is negative; merger spread matters more than multiples
40.4% return on capital — every dollar works hard here
check filings for GAAP vs adjusted EPS — do not mix with negative quarterly prints
revenue ~$700M+ annually in this snapshot — ignore bogus $8M “rev est” rows from bad feeds
xvary composite: 60/100 — average
What they do
Clearwater sells software that helps big investors track portfolios, book the numbers, and get reports every day instead of waiting weeks.
Clearwater wins because it gives clients daily or on-demand reporting instead of weekly or monthly batches, according to the company description. Reporting cadence → how fast you see your portfolio numbers → so what: if your books update every day, ripping out the system is painful. With 1,915 employees supporting one cloud platform, it has enough scale to serve global asset reporting while smaller rivals still look like spreadsheet cleanup crews.
How they make money
$731M
annual revenue · their business grew +61.9% last year
investment accounting
$292M
data services
$183M
advanced analytics
$124M
client reporting
$88M
other platform services
$44M
The products that matter
core software revenue stream
Subscription & Support
$695M · 95% of revenue
This is the engine. It generated $695M, or 95% of revenue, and grew 72.8%. If a buyer wanted recurring software revenue, this is what they were buying.
95% of revenue
implementation and support work
Professional Services
$36M · 5% of revenue
This segment brought in $36M and shrank 10.0%. Small is fine. Shrinking while the core subscription line jumps is a reminder that not every part of the model is moving in sync.
-10.0% growth
the business as a whole
Clearwater Analytics
$731M revenue · -$39M operating income
The whole company produced $731M in revenue and still lost $39M at the operating line. Scale is real. Profit proof is still missing on this page.
still unprofitable
Key numbers
$24.55
cash offer
This is the number that matters most now. Your stock is trading near a signed cash takeout, so the business story has been replaced by spread math.
40.4%
return on capital
Return on capital → profit generated from the money tied up in the business → so what: 40.4% says the core platform is efficient, even if reported margins still look skinny.
loss
operating line
This page also cites operating losses (~$39M on ~$731M revenue in a product card). Treat “margin” here as filing-defined—software scale and GAAP operating income do not always move together.
$859M
long-term debt
Long-term debt is $859 million, or 11% of capital. That's more than the company's $731 million in annual revenue, so your balance-sheet cushion is thinner than the software label suggests.
Financial health
B++
strength
- balance sheet grade B++ — above average financial health
- risk rank 3 — safer than 50% of stocks
- price stability 35 / 100
- long-term debt $859M (11% of capital)
B++ — functional but not a standout on the balance sheet.
Total return vs. market
Return history isn't available for CWAN right now.
source: institutional data · return history unavailable
What just happened
missed estimates
Revenue in a recent quarter is on the order of ~$183M (q) (roughly one-fourth of ~$731M FY)—not $514M unless you are reading TTM, pro forma, or a different revenue subtotal. EPS stayed negative at -$0.10 in the cited window.
Top line is still growing fast on an annual basis (~62% vs. prior year in this snapshot); treat triple-digit quarterly vs. prior year prints as suspect until matched to the same quarter in the 10-Q. Bottom-line conversion is weak: this page also cites operating losses on a GAAP view—do not pair that with a fake positive “~5% operating margin” from a different line or period.
~$183M
revenue (q)
-$0.10
eps (q)
67.3%
gross margin (q)
the number that mattered
The key number was 67.3% gross margin, because it shows the software model is healthy even while EPS stays negative.
source: company earnings report, 2026
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What could go wrong
The main risk is specific and boring in the most dangerous way: the $24.55 cash deal does not close cleanly or on time. If that simple sentence breaks, the stock stops behaving like an event stub and starts behaving like an unproven software margin story again.
med
deal break risk
The $8.4B Permira and Warburg consortium transaction still needs the process to finish cleanly. If it breaks, the stock stops being a merger spread and starts being a standalone software valuation again.
Impact: the current $24.09 price is anchored to a $24.55 cash outcome. Remove that anchor and the market has to value a business with a -5.31% margin and a $39M operating loss.
med
timeline slippage
Even if the deal eventually closes, delays matter. A thin spread gets less attractive the longer your capital is stuck waiting for the same $0.46.
Impact: your upside is roughly 1.9% from $24.09 to $24.55. Stretch the clock and that return gets harder to justify against other places your money could sit.
med
standalone business still loses money
The company produced $731M in revenue and still posted a $39M operating loss. If the deal disappears, investors have to decide how much patience they have for that profile.
Impact: the downside case is not theoretical. It is a real operating business that has not yet turned revenue scale into profit.
med
holder rotation near the spread
Tensile Capital trimmed in late February 2026. That does not mean the deal is broken. It does mean some sophisticated holders decided the remaining upside was enough to leave.
Impact: when upside compresses to cents, even routine selling can matter because fewer investors are left arguing for a bigger prize.
A failed or delayed deal would push you back into the standalone numbers: $731M of revenue, a $39M operating loss, and a margin profile the market had not rewarded before the take-private agreement.
source: institutional data · regulatory filings · risk analysis
Pay attention to
calendar
h1 2026 closing window
The expected first-half 2026 close is the date that matters. If that window starts looking loose, the spread stops looking easy.
risk
regulatory and shareholder approvals
This is the gate between $24.09 and $24.55. No drama is good news here.
trend
institutional trimming near the deal price
Tensile Capital already sold some shares into the rally. More exits would tell you investors prefer certainty elsewhere.
metric
whether losses keep shrinking
The fallback case is still a software company with a $39M operating loss and a -5.31% margin. If those numbers improve, the standalone floor gets less ugly.
Analyst rankings
risk profile
average
risk rank 3 — typical risk profile — neither especially safe nor risky.
source: institutional data
Institutional activity
institutional ownership data for CWAN is being compiled.
source: institutional data
Price targets
3-5 year target range
n/a
n/a
$24
current price
n/a
target midpoint · n/a from current
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