Borealis Foods

Borealis loses $1.25 a share on just $28 million of sales, which is one expensive bowl of ramen.

If you own BRLS, you own a tiny food stock growing fast and still burning cash hard.

brls

consumer small cap updated jan 2, 2026
$1.69
market cap ~$35M · 52-week range $1–$7
xvary composite: insufficient data
not enough institutional data to compute a composite score for this company
Start here if you're new
what it is
Borealis sells instant noodle and ready-meal brands like Chef Woo and Ramen Express through about 25,000 U.S. stores.
how it gets paid
Last year Borealis Foods made $29M in revenue. Chef Woo was the main engine at $14M, or 48% of sales.
what just happened
The latest quarter showed $22M in revenue, but the bigger number was the -$0.59 EPS loss.
At a glance
n/a balance sheet
-$1.25 fy2024 eps est
$28M fy2024 rev est
70.1% operating margin
~$35M market cap
What they do
Borealis sells instant noodle and ready-meal brands like Chef Woo and Ramen Express through about 25,000 U.S. stores.
The pitch is shelf space and distribution, not brand royalty. Borealis says it reaches about 25,000 U.S. stores plus 3,300 in Canada, so your odds of seeing the product are better than your odds of seeing profits. Scale moat → being big enough to produce and ship cheaply → so what: Borealis does not have it yet, which helps explain an operating margin of -70.1%.
consumer microcap packaged-foods ramen turnaround
How they make money
$29M annual revenue
Chef Woo
$14M
+173%
Ramen Express
$9M
+45%
Woodles and other brands
$6M
flat
The products that matter
high-protein instant noodles
Chef Woo Ramen
flagship brand · revenue not separately disclosed
It won top honors from two national publications in 2025, but the company still generated only $27.90M of trailing revenue overall, so brand attention has not yet translated into scale.
brand test
ready-to-eat food products
Plant-Based Meals
$7.7M q3 2024 sales · +45%
This line drove a 45% quarterly sales increase to $7.7M in q3 2024. That's a real growth signal, even if one quarter does not fix a company-wide loss profile.
growth pocket
other revenue streams
Other Revenue
$5.6M · 20% of revenue
This bucket is one-fifth of sales, but the disclosure is thin. When a $27.90M company has a material revenue line with limited detail, you should want more explanation, not less.
disclosure watch
Key numbers
70.1%
operating margin
Operating margin → profit after running the business → so what: Borealis loses about 70 cents for every $1 of sales before interest and taxes.
$29M
annual revenue
Revenue → total sales → so what: the business is real, but still tiny against a public market value of about $35M.
-$1.25
fy2024 eps
EPS → profit per share → so what: each share absorbed a $1.25 loss in FY2024, which is large against a $1.69 stock price.
11.1%
gross margin
Gross margin → money left after making the product → so what: Borealis keeps only about 11 cents per sales dollar before paying corporate costs.
Financial health
n/a
strength
  • balance sheet grade n/a
  • long-term debt $4M (10% of capital)
n/a — functional but not a standout on the balance sheet.
Total return vs. market

Return history isn't available for BRLS right now.

source: institutional data · return history unavailable
What just happened
missed estimates
The latest quarter showed $22M in revenue, but the bigger number was the -$0.59 EPS loss.
Sales jumped 173% vs. prior year, according to EDGAR. Revenue growth → more product sold → so what: it did not translate into profitability, with gross margin still only 11.1%.
$22M
revenue
-$0.59
eps
11.1%
gross margin
the number that mattered
11.1% gross margin mattered most because food companies need room between production cost and shelf price, and Borealis barely has any.
source: company earnings report, 2026

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What could go wrong

the #1 risk is Frontwell Capital's $5M default cure demand.

!
high
Frontwell Capital default cure demand
The lender issued a 14-day ultimatum on feb 2, 2026 requiring BRLS to raise $5M.
With just $128.87K of cash, the funding gap is roughly 39x cash on hand. That can force expensive financing, restricted credit, or worse.
!
high
negative shareholders' equity
Total liabilities of $69.25M exceed total assets of $56.30M, leaving equity at -$12.95M.
That weakens access to capital right when the company most needs new capital.
med
nasdaq compliance deadline
The company has until may 31, 2026 to hold its annual meeting and regain compliance.
If it fails, a listing problem becomes a liquidity problem for shareholders too.
med
thin margins in a crowded category
Gross margin reached 17% in q3 2024, but trailing revenue still fell 1.65% last year while the industry grew 0.89%.
If growth stalls or promotions rise, a low-margin food business can burn cash faster than investors expect.
The combined picture is simple: 100% of this $27.90M revenue business sits behind a balance sheet with only $128.87K of cash, -$12.95M of equity, and a live $5M funding demand.
source: institutional data · regulatory filings · risk analysis
Pay attention to
financing
$5M cure demand
This is the immediate test. If new capital does not arrive, every other part of the story becomes secondary.
deadline
nasdaq compliance by may 31, 2026
The annual meeting requirement sounds procedural. On a microcap, it can decide whether the stock remains easy to trade.
margin
gross margin holding above 17%
Gross margin is the early proof point. If it slips back, the path to profitability gets longer, not shorter.
sales trend
whether revenue can get back above the current $27.90M run rate
A food brand can survive rough quarters. It usually cannot survive shrinking sales, negative equity, and funding stress at the same time.
Analyst rankings
street rating
1.00 / 5
Consensus sits at sell. In human-speak: the little analyst coverage this stock has is negative.
marketbeat percentile
bottom 20%
The company scored higher than only 20% of companies evaluated. That is weak relative positioning, not just weak sentiment.
coverage quality
thin
Sparse coverage is common in microcaps. It can create opportunity, but it more often creates blind spots.
source: institutional data
Institutional activity

institutional ownership data for BRLS is being compiled.

source: institutional data
Price targets
3-5 year target range
n/a n/a
$2 current price
n/a target midpoint · n/a from current
target data not available

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