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what it is
Bridgford sells frozen dough, sandwiches, jerky, sausage, and deli meats through wholesalers and 21,000 stores.
how it gets paid
Last year Bridgford Foods made $231M in revenue. dry sausage & beef jerky was the main engine at $69.3M, or 30% of sales.
why it's growing
Revenue grew 3.3% last year. Revenue grew 5% vs. prior year in the latest quarter.
what just happened
Quarterly sales rose to $55M, but Bridgford still posted a loss.
At a glance
B balance sheet — gets the job done, barely
15/100 earnings predictability — expect surprises
2.8% return on capital — nothing to write home about
-$0.37 fy2024 eps est
~$231M reported FY revenue
xvary composite: 52/100 — below average
What they do
Bridgford sells frozen dough, sandwiches, jerky, sausage, and deli meats through wholesalers and 21,000 stores.
This business wins the boring way. It already sells through about 820 wholesalers and reaches about 21,000 stores in all 50 states. Distribution network (how products reach shelves) → shelf access that took decades to build → so what: you are buying placement and relationships, not just meat sticks.
How they make money
$231M
annual revenue · their business grew +3.3% last year
dry sausage & beef jerky
$69.3M
2.0%
bread, biscuit & roll dough
$60.1M
+6.0%
frozen sandwiches
$34.7M
+5.0%
sliced luncheon meats
$27.7M
0.0%
resale foods and sides
$39.2M
+4.0%
The products that matter
manufactures frozen bakery items
Frozen Bread & Roll Dough
~$94.8M · ~41% of ~$231M FY
On the revenue bridge, bread, biscuit & roll dough ($60.1M) plus frozen sandwiches ($34.7M) sum to ~$94.8M (~41% of FY) — not a single $162M lump. The old ~70% cut did not reconcile to those rows.
largest segment
sells meat snacks
Beef Jerky & Snack Sticks
$69.3M · ~30% of ~$231M FY
Matches dry sausage & beef jerky on the bridge. Demand has stayed soft enough that price increases did not fix the volume problem.
demand watch
Key numbers
0.2%
operating margin
Operating margin (profit after running the business) → basically break-even → so what: one bad cost month can erase the year.
27.8%
walmart sales
Customer concentration (how much one buyer matters) → more than a quarter of revenue from Walmart → so what: your largest customer has leverage.
$2M
long-term debt
Long-term debt (money owed over years) → only $2M, or 3% of capital → so what: leverage is not the main problem here.
$231M
annual revenue
Revenue (money coming in) → $231M, up 3.3% vs. prior year → so what: sales are growing, but profit is not following.
Financial health
B
strength
- balance sheet grade B — adequate — nothing special
- risk rank 3 — safer than 50% of stocks
- price stability 35 / 100
- long-term debt $2M (3% of capital)
B — functional but not a standout on the balance sheet.
Total return vs. market
Return history isn't available for BRID right now.
source: institutional data · return history unavailable
What just happened
missed estimates
Quarterly sales rose to $55M, but Bridgford still posted a loss.
Revenue grew 5% vs. prior year in the latest quarter, while EPS came in at negative $0.09 versus negative $0.12 a year earlier on the provided data. Gross margin for the annual period was 24.2%, and cost pressure stayed heavy.
$55M
revenue
-$0.09
eps
24.2%
gross margin
the number that mattered
The number that mattered was ~0.2% operating margin on the latest FY print here, because tiny profit leaves you no cushion when meat or freight costs move against you.
source: company earnings report, 2026
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What could go wrong
Bridgford's problem is specific: weak profitability is colliding with lender tests and customer concentration at the same time.
high
recurring covenant breaches
Bridgford breached its quick ratio covenant in Q4 2025 and its net income covenant in Q1 2026. The waivers solved the immediate problem. They did not fix the business.
If waivers stop coming, even a modest debt load turns into a financing problem fast.
high
customer concentration with US Foods
One customer represented 27.8% of revenue, or about $65M. That gives a single buyer unusual influence over pricing, volume, and placement.
Losing part of that relationship would hit a business that is already barely above breakeven at the operating line.
med
volume erosion despite higher prices
Sales volume fell 6% even after a 5.6% price increase. That tells you demand is price-sensitive, and price is not a free fix from here.
A business with a 0.2% operating margin does not have room for repeated volume misses.
med
thin institutional support
Institutional ownership is only 4.68%. Low sponsorship does not make a stock bad, but it does mean fewer natural buyers if the story gets worse.
That leaves the shares more illiquid and more exposed to sentiment swings when results disappoint.
Four risks matter most. The covenant issue is immediate, the customer issue is concentrated, and the margin issue ties both together.
source: institutional data · regulatory filings · risk analysis
Pay attention to
the metric
operating margin has to move off the floor
At 0.2%, the core business is barely profitable before interest and taxes. A real turnaround needs visible improvement here, not just better language on the call.
the risk
another covenant waiver would be a red flag
One waiver is a warning. Two in close succession looks like a pattern. You want to see the company stop asking lenders for patience.
the calendar
next earnings need more than revenue
The next report matters because you need updates on volume trends, covenant compliance, and whether pricing is still offsetting weaker unit demand.
the trend
watch volume versus price, not price alone
A 5.6% price increase looked helpful until volume fell 6%. If that pairing keeps repeating, revenue quality is getting worse, not better.
Analyst rankings
earnings predictability
15 / 100
in human-speak, the next quarter is hard to model because this business is still absorbing demand and margin shocks.
price stability
35 / 100
The stock has been more jumpy than steady. That's what happens when profits are thin and conviction is thin too.
source: institutional data
Institutional activity
institutional ownership data for BRID is being compiled.
source: institutional data
Price targets
3-5 year target range
n/a
n/a
$7
current price
n/a
target midpoint · n/a from current
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